Is there an African philosophy?
The above question has become the central focus of scholarly debates since the mid-20th century. The curiosity was triggered by the rise in African nationalism and the anti-colonial movement of that time. Many Africans who had been educated in Europe and had been trained within the frameworks of Western philosophy felt the urge to articulate a distinct philosophical tradition that could encapsulate the African experience.
At the same time, some Western scholars, motivated by a combination of curiosity and condescension, began to explore African intellectual tradition. For them, Africa, widely perceived as inferior by the West at that time, lacked sophisticated philosophical structures that could match the Western one. In their attempts to understand African thoughts, these scholars were mostly guided by the assumption that African philosophy, if it existed, was either an extension of or a deviation from Western paradigms.
Because of this, early topics on African philosophy revolved around some critical issues that affected the continent at the time, like freedom and racism. However, the very concept of African philosophy lacked a clear definition. Was it a genuine expression of the indigenous African thoughts, and if so, what were its specific themes? Or was it merely a Western-influenced construct that had been shaped by the experience of African scholars who had internalised European modes of thinking?
African contributions to global philosophical thought
To begin with, claiming that Africa has never possessed a philosophical tradition is as implausible as suggesting that one can walk without feet. Admittedly, while an individual might be born without feet, the necessity to move and progress is undeniable. Philosophy is the foundational compass in any society. It is the mental architect that guides us on where to place our steps. Every society is built upon this philosophical foundation as here, collective thoughts are born. Thus, the notion that Africa lacks a philosophical tradition is not only unrealistic but disparaging too. It overlooks the seriously diverse intellectual traditions that have shaped African societies for centuries.
If we reel back a little in history, most pre-Socratic writers acknowledged Africa to be the foundation of early knowledge. Isocrates confirmed in the 5th century BCE that many Greek thinkers, one among them Pythagoras of Samos, travelled to Egypt to pursue knowledge. Again, before the advent of German idealism, Africa had already contributed to philosophical discourse through figures such as Ethiopia’s Zera Yacob and Walda Heywat, who wrote extensively on ethics and psychology. To add to this, the medieval empires of Songhai and Mali in North Africa were instrumental in shaping the philosophical tenets of Islamic thought.
However, much of what we know as the history of philosophy is based on written records. This reliance on documentation has obscured the philosophical achievements of regions with less developed systems of record-keeping. This has subsequently led to an incomplete understanding of their contribution. It is this realisation that motivated many African scholars of the 20th century to seek and affirm the existence and significance of the indigenous African thought system. They recognised that African philosophies were often oral and thus underrepresented in the historical record.
One of these key scholars was Kenya’s Henry Odera Oruka. To address the complexities surrounding African philosophy, Oruka developed some fundamental concepts that were to help us better understand and analyse the indigenous thought system, and to prove that African philosophy did not originate in modern Africa. To effectively define African philosophy, Oruka first divided it into four approaches, or, as he called them, ‘candidates’, namely; ethnophilosophy, philosophic sagacity, nationalistic philosophy and professional philosophy.
Odera Oruka’s framework for African philosophy
Earlier before Oruka’s discourse, ethnophilosophy and professional philosophy were already two antagonistic approaches furthered by their proponents to be the ideal candidates for African philosophy. On one side, ethnophilosophy, championed by Placide Tempels in his work Bantu Philosophy, argued that African philosophy is embedded in a set of shared beliefs, values, and cultural practices of African communities. It saw the metaphysical classification of Africans as a communal property, rather than a product of the individual.
Conversely, proponents of professional philosophy argued that true philosophical inquiry in Africa should be conducted systematically by trained scholars within an academic context. To reconcile these divergent approaches, Oruka introduced the idea of philosophic sagacity. He argued through this approach that indigenous African elders, known as “traditional sages”, had a repository of wisdom and rigorous critical thinking despite having no formal education and little or no Western intellectual influence. Philosophic sagacity thus challenged the premise of ethnophilosophy by recognising sages, rather than the community at large, as the true bearers and creators of knowledge within a society.
This concept of philosophic sagacity, often considered the foundational approach to understanding African philosophy, no doubt has its limitations. Oruka’s bid to substantiate this approach involved documenting and analysing the perspectives of African individuals known for their wisdom and independent critical thinking. However, some questions have been raised against this methodology.
One criticism is that not all the reflections of sages are necessarily philosophical. The independent critical inclination of these sages, if any, only forms an intellectual identity of African philosophers but not an African philosophy. Critics argue that the absence of original transcriptions of the sages' thoughts, which would allow for their integration into a collective theoretical tradition, undermines their classification as ‘African Philosophy’. Others see problems with the conversational approach employed in Oruka’s research. Moreover, this research was also limited by its focus on a specific demographic—predominantly African elders. In African traditions, age confers significant authority, and these elders are often beyond reproach, particularly when they are seen as custodians of traditional knowledge. This immunity from criticism further complicates the evaluation of their contributions to African philosophy.
Nationalistic-ideological philosophy and its role in postcolonial Africa
Nationalistic-ideological philosophy, another African philosophical trend, was mostly used by the African founding fathers to develop an ending framework for the liberation of the African people from the material and ideological clutches of Neo-colonialism. It was instrumental in attaining independence in various African countries, and it subsequently played a pivotal role in shaping postcolonial development strategies. For instance, Kenya’s founding father, Jomo Kenyatta, formulated a “Harambee philosophy” to call for the nation’s collective efforts to advocate for independence and later engage in nation-building. Similarly, in Tanzania, President Julius Nyerere used his “Ujamaa” movement to advance his socialist agenda. Despite their historical significance, these nationalistic-ideological philosophies manifested majorly as political ideologies. For this reason, they have led to rigid and dogmatic thinking, which has, in turn, impeded critical and open-minded philosophical inquiry.
Thus, one of the questions we ought to be asking ourselves right now is: What precisely constitutes African philosophy, and why, despite decades of research have we yet to establish a foundation robust enough to guide our intellectual pursuits as African people? This problem is perhaps rooted in the historical reality that the concept of philosophy was introduced to African societies through colonial languages—a term and practice previously unfamiliar to our indigenous intellectual traditions. Consequently, in our quest to develop a philosophical framework, we have often found ourselves diverted by the need to construct a system of thought that mirrors the structures imposed upon us by colonial powers.
It is this realisation, perhaps, that prompted Ghana’s Kwasi Wiredu, a prominent figure in 20th-century African philosophy, to come up with the concept of “conceptual decolonisation”. Wiredu’s approach tended to re-examine and re-conceptualise African thoughts through the lens of African language and conceptual framework, rather than those imposed by Western philosophy. He argued that colonialism was not merely a political imposition but also a cultural one that gravely infected our religions and systems of education.
Hence, one critical truth that we must acknowledge if the continent aims to address the root of this problem is that the introduction of philosophy in foreign languages has led to a conceptual alignment with the cultures of these foreign powers. This process has contributed to the de-Africanisation of thought, irrespective of whether the philosophy is African. Since these philosophies are academically formulated and articulated in a foreign language—for example, English—the message is already substantially Westernised.
The role of academia and the future of African philosophy
It becomes challenging for Africans, who have been trained in some foreign philosophical traditions, to formulate their philosophical framework in their language. Currently, much of what we call “African philosophy” are discourses done by philosophers of African descent, who are often heavily influenced by the curricula of their academic training. Contemporary African philosophers must approach their work with an entirely fresh perspective, free from the limitations imposed by traditional academic discipline labelled “African philosophy” if African philosophy is to genuinely thrive. And to realise this, African academic institutions must begin with some strategic reorientation in some of their key departments to align and meet the specific needs of African philosophy.
The University of Nairobi, for example, has shown little commitment to the development of African philosophy as an academic discipline. The Department of Philosophy was initially a subcategory of Religious Studies, with the majority of its staff being priests and lay theologians who demonstrated little interest in African Philosophy. It was not until 1980, under the leadership of Professor Henry Odera Oruka, that the department was separated from Religious Studies. However, after Oruka’s death, the department was once again merged with Religion. Additionally, the university has redirected some of its research to departments like Religion and Anthropology. The studies from these departments contain African worldviews, which are relevant to African philosophy.
Kenyatta University, another key Kenyan institution, has done little to recognise or integrate African philosophical traditions into its curriculum. Most of its philosophical content is Eurocentric, and this has significantly hindered the cultivation of a philosophy that is reflective of and responsive to local socio-cultural contexts. Above all, the broader issue of inadequate academic staffing across many African institutions has compromised the quality of instructions.
Even if we make efforts to address these challenges within our key academic institutions and to rigorously stack philosophical topics in our curricula, there remains a persistent and often unexamined pressure to venture continent-wide generalisations about African philosophy. How, for example, will we achieve a homogeneity between the philosophical tenets of Eastern Africa and those of its Western counterpart? Presenting African philosophy as a monolithic entity that is uniformly embraced across the continent may indeed raise the continent’s respect on the global stage. But this approach, we must agree, also carries the risk of promoting a superficial understanding, particularly among foreign audiences, who might adopt a touristic perspective rather than engage with the substantive contribution of African thoughts. As it stands, many foreigners, particularly in the West, have hitherto not woken up to the recognition that there is such a thing as ‘African philosophy’ and even if there is, many are yet to come to terms with the fact that it is something from which they might conceivably have something to learn.
We owe much of the modern world to Western philosophy. While this philosophy has proven instrumental in shaping some of the contemporary thoughts, society and culture, it has also marginalised and suppressed traditional philosophical thought systems, leading to a form of intellectual dependence. At this historical juncture, African philosophy has the necessity to be competitive, for this way, we will promote intellectual independence. A society that relies on external intellectual frameworks cannot be considered truly free.
The most effective way to resist cultural imperialism is by rediscovering and revitalizing our intellectual heritage to uniquely be compatible with our historical and cultural contexts. This can only be achieved if we reevaluate our collective thought system, and direct it to address the realities of the African experience. It is only through this that Africa may reclaim its rightful place on the global intellectual stage.
